DHS Needs to Enhance
Its COVID-19 Response at
the Southwest Border
September 10, 2021
OIG-21-60
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov
September 10, 2021
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Digitally signed by
JOSEPH V
JOSEPH V CUFFARI
Inspector General
Date: 2021.09.09
CUFFARI
16:11:32 -04'00'
SUBJECT: DHS Needs to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response
at the Southwest Border
For your action is our final report, DHS Needs to Enhance Its COVID-19
Response at the Southwest Border. We incorporated the formal comments
provided by your office.
The report contains two recommendations aimed at improving the
Department’s COVID-19 response at the southwest border. Your office
concurred with both recommendations. Based on information provided in your
response to the draft report, we consider both recommendations open and
resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please
submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the
recommendations. The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of
completion of agreed-upon corrective actions. Please send your response or
closure request to [email protected].
Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will
provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and
appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We
will post the report on our website for public dissemination.
Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Bruce Miller,
Deputy Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.
www.oig.dhs.gov
DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
DHS Needs to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response
at the Southwest Border
September 10, 2021
Why We Did
This Inspection
In October 2020, in conjunction
with the COVID-19 pandemic,
the United States began
experiencing a surge of
migrants at the southwest
border, adding increased risk to
an unprecedented public health
emergency. DHS, in addition
to its broad mission, is
responsible for helping detect
and slow the spread of COVID-
19. During this inspection, we
received a referral from the
Office of Special Counsel
concerning the lack of COVID-
19 testing at one CBP location.
We conducted a limited review
to determine to what extent
DHS has implemented
measures to mitigate the spread
of COVID-19 in migrants at the
southwest border.
What We
Recommend
We made two recommendations
to the Department to improve
its response to COVID-19 at the
southwest border.
For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at
(202) 981-6000, or email us at
DHS-OIG.OfficePublicA[email protected]
What We Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not
conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants who enter CBP
custody and is not required to do so. Instead, CBP
relies on local public health systems to test
symptomatic individuals. According to CBP officials,
as a frontline law enforcement agency, it does not have
the necessary resources to conduct such testing. For
migrants who are transferred or released from CBP
custody into the United States, CBP coordinates with
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, and other Federal, state, and
local partners for COVID-19 testing of migrants.
Although DHS generally follows guidance from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for
COVID-19 preventative measures, DHS’ multi-layered
COVID-19 testing framework does not require CBP to
conduct COVID-19 testing at CBP facilities. Further,
DHS’ Chief Medical Officer does not have the authority
to direct or enforce COVID-19 testing procedures.
Currently, only the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and
CBP leadership can direct CBP to implement COVID-
19 measures.
Without stronger COVID-19 prevention measures in
place, DHS is putting its workforce, support staff,
communities, and migrants at greater risk of
contracting the virus.
DHS’ Response
DHS concurred with both recommendations.
www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-21-60
Figure 1. FY 2020 and FY 2021
CBP Southwest Border Encounters
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Background
In October 2020, in conjunction with the COVID-19 pandemic, the United
States began experiencing a surge of migrants
1
at the southwest border, adding
increased risk to an unprecedented public health emergency. The Department
of Homeland Security, in addition to its broad homeland security mission, is at
the forefront of helping detect and slow the spread of COVID-19. See Figure 1
for a comparison of the number of migrants encountered by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) at the southwest border in fiscal year 2020 and FY
2021.
DHS’ Chief Medical Officer (DHS
CMO) is the principal advisor to
the Secretary and other senior
Department officials on medical
and public health issues related
to natural disasters, border
health, acts of terrorism, and
pandemic response, including
COVID-19. In addition, the
DHS CMO provides support to
DHS components on evolving
operational needs in the
COVID-19 environment. DHS
components, such as CBP, U.S.
Immigration and Customs
Source: cbp.gov
Enforcement (ICE), and the
Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), all play instrumental, but unique, roles in
implementing COVID-19 prevention measures at the southwest border.
CBP apprehends migrants crossing the border without authorization, or at U.S.
ports of entry if an individual is deemed inadmissible. CBP is responsible for
the short-term detention of migrants while they are being processed. CBP
established the National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search
(TEDS)
2
to govern the safety, security, and care of migrants while in custody.
CBP contracts with Loyal Source Government Services to provide healthcare
professionals to help with the medical process, including first aid and triage,
1
Migrants include populations of unaccompanied children, family units, and single adults.
2
CBP National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search, dated October 29, 2015,
are the national standards for CBP’s interaction with detained individuals, including guidance
for at-risk individuals in CBP custody. At-risk individuals are those in the custody of CBP who
may require additional care or oversight.
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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health interviews, and medical evaluations, which include screening for
COVID-19 symptoms and exposures. At locations without contracted medical
staff, CBP personnel conduct initial health screenings.
ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations is responsible for long-term
detention of inadmissible family units and single adults. The U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) houses noncitizen unaccompanied
children (UC), while FEMA provides a support role to HHS in its efforts to
receive, shelter, and transfer these UCs crossing the southwest border. In
particular, FEMA provides technical assistance on housing UCs, and
commodities (e.g., water, cots, and blankets) from in-stock inventory.
Although there is no Federal mandate for COVID-19 testing of migrants at the
southwest border, DHS generally follows guidance from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) for COVID-19 preventative measures.
Specifically, DHS developed a multi-layer framework to ensure all migrants
entering the United States are tested for COVID-19 “prior to onwards travel
into the United States.” According to DHS Office of the Executive Secretary
officials, the Department’s COVID-19 testing framework is as follows:
Since February 2021, through robust partnerships with state,
local, and non-governmental organizations, in coordination with
the CMO, the Department has developed a multi-layer framework
that ensures all noncitizens entering the United States are tested
for COVID-19 prior to onwards travel into the United States. After
initial health screening by CBP at the point of encounter,
noncitizens are tested by ICE (single adults), [state, local, tribal,
and territorial government/non-governmental organizations]
partnerships and [DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Office] contractors in support of CBP (family units), or HHS
(unaccompanied children).
This DHS COVID-19 testing framework is not documented in a formal policy.
According to Department officials, this framework has been communicated
DHS-wide by the DHS CMO, in coordination with DHS component leadership,
through frequent conference calls, on-site field visits, and various other modes
of communication.
Since the beginning of the pandemic, the media has highlighted concerns with
overcrowding at southwest border facilities and the potential for migrants to
spread COVID-19 to other migrants while detained and to communities upon
release. We also received a hotline complaint from the Office of Special
Counsel concerning one CBP processing center that highlighted concerns
related to a lack of testing and quarantining migrants for COVID-19, and
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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subsequent employee notifications regarding potential exposure. We
conducted a limited review to determine to what extent DHS has implemented
screening, testing, and isolating measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19
among migrants at the southwest border. See Appendix B for a list of ongoing
DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) work and issued reports related to the
Department’s COVID-19 response.
Results of Inspection
CBP Does Not Conduct COVID-19 Testing for Migrants Crossing
the Southwest Border
CBP does not conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants who enter CBP custody.
Instead, CBP relies on local public health systems to test symptomatic
individuals. According to CBP officials, as a frontline law enforcement agency,
it does not have the necessary resources to conduct such testing. For migrants
who are transferred or released from CBP custody into the United States, CBP
coordinates with DHS, ICE, HHS, and other Federal, state, and local partners
for COVID-19 testing of migrants. Although there is no requirement for CBP to
conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants, CBP is still responsible for the safety,
security, and care of migrants while in short-term custody. According to CBP’s
policy and guidance,
3
once taken into custody, migrants are to receive a health
screening to identify any potential medical issues or whether an individual may
have COVID-19 symptoms, such as fever, chills, cough, or shortness of breath.
CBP established the COVID-19 Decision Matrix, shown in Appendix C, to guide
personnel during the health intake interview. Although CDC guidance
generally recommends testing, isolating, and contact tracing for those exposed
to large social gatherings or crowded indoor settings, CBP’s COVID-19 Decision
Matrix only requires CBP to screen and isolate symptomatic individuals or
those with known exposures. According to CBP officials and TEDs § 4.10, CBP
isolates migrants as operationally feasible. To have a migrant in custody
tested, as required by the Decision Matrix, CBP is to contact the local public
health department for testing guidance. If the public health official
recommends a test, CBP would then transfer the individual to a local
emergency room for COVID-19 testing and evaluation. For instance, if
contracted medical staff encounter an individual with a high fever — a key
symptom of COVID-19 — they would have to call a local public health
3
CBP’s TEDS and CBP Directive No. 2210-004, Enhanced Medical Support Efforts, dated
December 30, 2019, include procedures for conducting health interviews or medical
assessments. Additionally, CBP has supplemental guidance, such as the COVID-19 Decision
Matrix used to guide personnel through assessing COVID-19 symptoms.
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department to determine whether the individual should be transferred to a
local medical facility for testing.
CBP’s process to obtain testing for migrants for COVID-19 may not always be
operationally feasible, especially during an influx of migrant crossings at the
southwest border. Border Patrol agents at one sector we surveyed said that
relying solely on local health systems in remote border communities is not a
sustainable testing plan. Because this was a limited review, we were unable to
confirm whether CBP is complying with its COVID-19 medical procedures at
Border Patrol stations and ports of entry or the effectiveness of these
procedures. However, as part of a separate OIG audit,
4
we identified CBP could
not always demonstrate staff conducted medical screenings in accordance with
its own policy.
Although DHS’ multi-layered COVID-19 testing framework
5
focuses on
ensuring “all noncitizens entering the United States are tested for COVID-19
prior to onwards travel into the United States,” it does not require CBP to
conduct COVID-19 testing at CBP Border Patrol stations and ports of
entry. Also, although the DHS CMO provides COVID-19 medical advice and
recommendations, the DHS CMO does not have the authority to direct or
enforce DHS components to comply. (See Appendix D for an example of DHS
CMO recommendations to CBP and ICE.) According to DHS officials, only the
Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and CBP leadership can direct CBP to implement
COVID-19 measures.
During our review, we interviewed and gathered written responses,
documentation, and data from several DHS officials including the DHS CMO,
CBP CMO, and CBP Border Patrol agents assigned to nine sectors
6
along the
southwest border. These officials provided the following statements related to
managing COVID-19 efforts at the southwest border:
CBP is not able to maintain proper physical distancing in holding
facilities due to the current number of migrants illegally entering the
United States, and ICE’s and HHS’ inability to rapidly take custody of
migrants.
Migrants are constantly reminded of COVID-19 risk but choose not to
social distance or wear provided masks.
4
CBP Needs to Strengthen Its Oversight and Policy to Better Care for Migrants Needing Medical
Attention, OIG-21-48, dated July 20, 2021.
5
As part of the Department’s COVID-19 framework, migrants are tested once they are
transferred to ICE and HHS custody, or by state, local, tribal, territorial, and non-governmental
organization partnerships.
6
Big Bend, Del Rio, El Centro, El Paso, Laredo, Rio Grande Valley, San Diego, Tucson, and
Yuma.
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
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The COVID-19 testing process for family units post-CBP custody is not
effective because municipalities cannot force families to isolate for the
required quarantine period.
Extended time-in-custody of migrants leads to overcapacity and
overcrowding at Border Patrol stations.
Erosion of Title 42 authority
7
has had a significant negative impact on
CBP’s COVID-19 mitigation measures and creates increased risk for CBP
personnel, migrants in custody, and local communities.
Absence of DHS CMO’s authority over component workforce health and
medical operations limits the establishment of a department-wide public
health approach.
Additionally, during one interview with a CBP supervisory Border Patrol agent
from a southwest border processing center, the agent raised specific concerns
regarding the health and safety of the CBP staff and migrants. The agent
stated that because CBP does not have a COVID-19 testing policy, UCs are
held in pods in close proximity with other potentially positive UCs. Moreover,
in some instances due to HHS being at capacity, UCs were in CBP custody for
more than 20 days
8
without being tested for COVID-19.
9
The agent also
expressed frustration with CBP’s lack of notification and contact tracing for
CBP staff when HHS tests UCs for COVID-19 after release from CBP custody.
As shown in Figure 2, in March and April 2021, CBP reported the following
positive COVID-19 employees and contractors at sectors along the southwest
border.
7
Title 42 U.S. Code § 265, Suspension of Entries, outlines that whenever the Surgeon General
determines, by reason of the existence of any communicable disease in a foreign country, that
there is considerable risk to the public health of the United States, the President may suspend
the introduction of those persons into the United States. On or about January 30, 2021, UCs
were temporarily exempted from Title 42 expulsions. This exception will remain in effect until
CDC has completed its public health assessment and published any notice or modified order.
8
Based on time-in-custody data provided by CBP, we determined UCs were held for as long as
26 days in March 2021 while awaiting placement with HHS.
9
UCs are tested for COVID-19 by HHS upon release from CBP custody.
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Figure 2. CBP Employees and Contractors Testing Positive for COVID-19
* The Big Bend Sector did not provide the requested information.
Source: DHS OIG analysis of CBP information
Although CBP is not conducting COVID-19 testing, we determined the DHS
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) has taken action to
assist with testing in two locations. Specifically, due to limited local testing
capacity in the Del Rio and Rio Grande Valley sectors, CWMD obligated $9.5
million for a short-term COVID-19 testing contract
10
for family units, effective
March 16, 2021. The statement of work for this contract outlines that CWMD
contractors, working on behalf of CBP, “shall administer, on a voluntary basis,
family unit aliens COVID-19 testing within or near USBP stations,” focusing on
the Del Rio and Rio Grande Valley sectors. According to CWMD officials and
contract documents, the contract ended on May 5, 2021, as a result of the DHS
CMO working with non-governmental organizations to take over testing and
isolation activities. As part of the CWMD-facilitated contract, approximately
22,000 COVID-19 tests were administered from March 18, 2021, to May 3,
2021.
Conclusion
The CDC stresses the importance of testing, isolating, and contact tracing
measures to control the spread of COVID-19. DHS leadership must commit to
strengthening these COVID-19 preventative measures. Without stronger
10
According to CWMD officials, CWMD was reimbursed by CBP through an interagency
agreement.
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measures in place, DHS is putting its workforce, support staff, communities,
and migrants at greater risk for contracting the virus. We acknowledge the
difficulty balancing protective measures with the primary mission of securing
the border. However, DHS must be prepared to meet the challenges of the
COVID-19 pandemic, as well as future pandemics.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1: We recommend the Secretary, in coordination with the
DHS Chief Medical Officer and components, reassess its COVID-19 response
framework to identify areas for improvement to mitigate the spread of COVID-
19 while balancing its primary mission of securing the border.
Recommendation 2: We recommend the Secretary ensure DHS components
continue to coordinate with the DHS Chief Medical Officer and are provided the
resources needed to operate safely and effectively during the COVID-19
pandemic and any future public health crisis.
Management Comments and OIG Analysis
DHS concurred with both recommendations. We included a copy of DHS’
management comments in their entirety in Appendix A. We also received
technical comments on the draft report and revised the report as appropriate.
A summary of the Department’s management comments and our analysis
follow.
DHS Comments to Recommendation 1: Concur. The DHS Chief Medical
Officer, through coordination with the components, will continue to ensure that
the Departments’ COVID-19 response framework is flexible and adaptable to
the dynamic situations posed by migration surges, COVID-19 positivity rates,
and increasing vaccination rates across the southwest border and nation. The
Department’s response stated that although resource constraints may present
a complex and challenging operating environment, the Department, led by the
CMO, will continue to implement improvement actions based on active
monitoring and impact analysis of mitigation efforts. The estimated completion
date is September 30, 2022.
OIG Analysis of DHS’ Response: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the
recommendation. We consider the recommendation open and resolved until
DHS provides documentation outlining its continued reassessment of the
COVID-19 response framework.
DHS Comments to Recommendation 2: Concur. The DHS Chief Medical
Officer continues to support communication, collaboration and coordination
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across components concerning the Department’s COVID-19 strategy, and
enhancement of the COVID-19 multi-layered framework. The Department will
prioritize efforts related to the DHS Chief Medical Officer to enhance the level of
coordinated oversight and resource support for the DHS public health and
medical enterprise. The estimated completion date is September 30, 2022.
OIG Analysis of DHS’ Response: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the
recommendation. We consider the recommendation open and resolved until
the Department provides documentation demonstrating components’ continued
coordination with the DHS Chief Medical Officer.
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was
established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107−296) by
amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978.
The objective of this review was to determine to what extent the Department
has implemented COVID-19 measures for migrants at the southwest border.
To achieve our objective we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed key Department
and component (CBP, ICE, and FEMA) information and documentation,
including:
policies and procedures for migrant COVID-19 screenings, testing, and
detainment/quarantine;
records/systems maintained, accessed, and shared by DHS/components
related to COVID-19 screening, testing, and isolating; and
Department and component data on migrants released into the United
States, including those tested for COVID-19.
During this inspection, we received a referral from the Office of Special Counsel
that related to our inspection objective. We incorporated the referral concerns
regarding a lack of testing and quarantining migrants for COVID-19, and
subsequent employee notifications regarding potential exposure into our review
process.
We interviewed officials from DHS’ Office of the Immigration Detention
Ombudsman and the DHS CMO in the CWMD. Within CBP, we interviewed
officials from the Office of Chief Medical Officer, Border Patrol Immigration
Prosecutions Custody Office, Border Patrol Corridors and Sectors, Office of
Field Operations, and Office of Statistics and Data Integrity. Within ICE, we
interviewed officials from ICE Health Services Corps, Alternatives to Detention
office, Law Enforcement Systems and Analysis section, and Office of Field
Operations. Lastly, within FEMA, we interviewed officials from the Office of
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Response and Recovery and Operation Artemis. We also obtained and analyzed
information related to the Department’s COVID-19 response from the Office of
the Executive Secretary and the Office of Strategy, Policy and Plans.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted all steps via telephone, email, or
video communication. Although the team did not physically travel for meetings
or site visits, we believe these restrictions did not impair our ability to gather
sufficient evidence to support our conclusions.
We reviewed data related to CBP migrant apprehensions. Additionally, we
reviewed department-wide COVID-19 testing data for migrants. We did not
verify the reliability of the data.
We conducted this review between March 2021 and May 2021 under the
authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to
the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
The Office of Audit major contributors to this report are Shelley Howes,
Director; Bradley Mosher, Audit Manager; Hope Wright, Auditor-in-Charge;
Melissa Brown, Program Analyst; Michael Brunelle, Program Analyst; Jacklyn
Pham, Auditor; Lindsey Koch, Communications Analyst; and Megan McNulty,
Independent Referencer.
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Appendix B
DHS OIG Ongoing Work and Issued Reports Related to the
Department’s COVID-19 Response at the Southwest Border
DHS OIG Ongoing Work
DHS
Project no. 21-020-SRE-DHS, DHS Prioritization of Frontline and
Mission Critical Employees for COVID-19 Vaccines. The objective is
to evaluate how DHS determined employee status for placement into
vaccine distribution priority groups and how, in conjunction with
Veterans Health Administration, DHS planned to triage and distribute
available vaccine inventory and vaccinate frontline, mission-critical DHS
staff. Additionally, we will evaluate how DHS executed its plans.
Project no. 21-036-AUD-DHS, DHS’ Air Transportation of Individual,
Family Unit, and Unaccompanied Children Migrants on Commercial
Flights. The objective is to determine the extent to which DHS mitigates
public safety risks while domestically transporting migrants on
commercial flights.
ICE
Project no. 20-051-SRE-ICE, ICE’s Efforts to Prevent and Mitigate the
Spread of COVID-19 in Its Facilities. The objective is to determine
whether ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations effectively controlled
COVID-19 within its detention facilities and adequately safeguarded the
health and safety of both detainees in its custody and its staff.
Project no. 21-001-SRE-ICE, Allegations about Inadequate Medical
Care and Other Concerns at the Irwin County Detention Center. The
objective is to determine whether the Irwin County Detention Center
provided adequate medical care and COVID-19 protection and properly
responded to complaints about facility operations.
FEMA
Project no. 20-038-AUD-FEMA, FEMA’s Support and Coordination of
Federal Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic. The objective is to
determine how effectively FEMA supports and coordinates Federal efforts
to distribute personal protective equipment and ventilators in response
to the COVID-19 outbreak.
Project no. 20-041-AUD-FEMA, FEMA’s Medical Supply Chain in
Response to COVID-19. The objective is to determine to what extent
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FEMA managed and distributed medical supplies and equipment in
response to COVID-19.
Project no. 20-043-AUD-FEMA, FEMA’s Administration of CARES Act
Funding for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program. The objective
is to determine whether FEMA's administration of the CARES Act
funding for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program ensures
individuals experiencing emergency financial hardships receive aid, in
accordance with Federal requirements to meet program goals.
Project no. 20-044-AUD-FEMA, FEMA’s Contracting Practices during
the COVID-19 Disaster Declaration. The objective is to determine to
what extent FEMA has practices and guidelines for non-competitively
awarding COVID-19 related contracts for unusual and compelling
circumstances.
Project no. 21-010-AUD-FEMA, FEMA’s Controls over Mission
Assignments in Response to COVID-19. The objective is to determine
to what extent FEMA develops and oversees mission assignments for
COVID-19 in accordance with FEMA's policies and procedures.
Project no. 21-039-AUD-FEMA, FEMA’s Funeral Assistance Program.
The objective is to determine how effective FEMA’s policies, procedures,
and internal controls are in providing proper oversight of its funeral
assistance program for COVID-19.
FLETC
Project no. 21-013-SRE-FLETC, FLETC Glynco Training Center’s
Actions to Respond to and Manage COVID-19. The objective is to
determine actions the Glynco training center has taken to prevent and
mitigate the spread of COVID-19 among staff and students.
DHS OIG Issued Reports
Early Experiences with COVID-19 at ICE Detention Facilities, OIG-
20-42, dated June 18, 2020. In April 2020, DHS OIG conducted a review
to determine how ICE was managing the pandemic at its facilities, with
respect to both detainees in its custody and to ICE staff.
Early Experiences with COVID-19 at CBP Border Patrol Stations
and OFO Ports of Entry, OIG-20-69, dated September 4, 2020.
Between April and May 2020, DHS OIG conducted a review to determine
how CBP was managing the pandemic at its facilities, with respect to
both migrants in its custody and to CBP staff.
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Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS’
Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning, OIG-21-14, dated December 21,
2020. Between April 2020 and July 2020, DHS OIG conducted this
review to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of DHS corrective
actions to address three OIG reports (OIG-14-129, OIG-16-18, and OIG-
17-02) containing 28 recommendations for improvement to DHS
pandemic planning and response.
Violations of Detention Standards amid COVID-19 Outbreak at La
Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, AZ, OIG-21-30, dated March 30,
2021. Between August and November 2020, DHS OIG conducted a
remote inspection of the La Palma Correctional Center to evaluate
compliance with ICE detention standards and COVID-19 requirements.
CBP Needs to Strengthen Its Oversight and Policy to Better Care for
Migrants Needing Medical Attention, OIG-21-48, dated July 20, 2021.
Between April 2020 and May 2021, DHS OIG conducted this audit to
determine whether CBP’s policies and procedures safeguard detained
migrants experiencing medical emergencies or illnesses along the
southwest border.
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Appendix E
Report Distribution
Department of Homeland Security
Secretary
Senior Official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Commissioner, CBP
CBP Component Liaison
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
www.oig.dhs.gov 18 OIG-21-60
Additional Information and Copies
To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at:
www.oig.dhs.gov.
For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General
Public Affairs at: [email protected].
Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig.
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